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The economy of Bangladesh has come a long way since the country achieved its independence at the end of 1971. The ravages of a prolonged war of Liberation, combined with the wrath of natural calamities both before and after, brought the economy to a state of utter despair soon after independence – so much so that the very viability of the economy came to be questioned at home and abroad. Over the next three decades and a half, the economy has not only survived, it has even begun to show signs of sustained vibrancy. The successes it has achieved so far and the challenges it faces from the vantage point of the first decade of the twenty first century form the subject matter of this essay.​[1]​

It took almost the whole of the 1970s to reconstruct and rehabilitate the war-ravaged economy, with per capita income crawling back to the pre-independence level by the early 1980s. Since then, a good deal of progress has been made in both economic and social spheres. The achievements in social spheres, in particular, have attracted special attention from the international community – for example, successes in bringing down infant mortality rate and fertility rate much faster than most countries at comparable levels of income, closing the gender gap in school education, and rapid increase in female labour force participation compared to most other countries with similar cultural-religious traditions, to name but a few. But some of the achievements in the narrowly economic sphere have been quite remarkable too. This is especially so when seen from the vantage point of the tottering state of the economy in the 1970s, and also when compared with the performance of other low-income countries in Asia and Africa. We shall begin by highlighting some of these achievements before moving on to the challenges that lie ahead.


II. Economic Successes: The Story So Far

The most basic achievement relates to economic growth, which is a necessary pre-condition for broader economic well-being. It’s not that Bangladesh’s rate of growth is spectacularly high; indeed, its growth rate falls short of what one finds in the high-performing countries of East and South-East Asia. The really encouraging part of the story lies in the sustained acceleration that Bangladesh has achieved in its rate of growth. After the recovery of 1970s, the rate of growth of GDP fluctuated in the 1980s around a lowly 3.7 per cent. But since the onset of the 1990s the economy has started to grow at an accelerating rate. The average annual growth rate first jumped to 4.4 per cent in the first half of the 1990s, but it soon crossed the 5 per cent mark hovering around 5.3 per cent during 1995-2005, and since 2005 it has accelerated further to over 6 per cent. With population growth slowing at the same time, the acceleration in terms of per capita income has been even more impressive. The growth of per capita income jumped from an average of 1.7 per cent in the 1980s to 3.0 per cent in the 1990s and again to 4.4 per cent in the 2000s. Since 2005, per capita income has been growing at more than 5 per cent per annum, representing a three-fold increase compared to the 1980s. The end result of all this is that the current generation of Bangladeshis is almost exactly twice as rich as was the preceding one.

All this may seem to pale in comparison with some of the Asian miracle economies that have managed to double their per capita income in one decade or less, but it is easy to forget that in the dismal decade of the 1970s, and even in the slightly better decade of the 1980s, the current rates of growth would have seemed like a distant dream in Bangladesh. It is also worth noting that Bangladesh’s performance compares highly favourably with the rest of the world other than Asia. For instance, the 4.5 per cent growth rate that Bangladesh achieved during the twenty-five year period from 1980 to 2005 is distinctly higher than the 3.6 per cent rate achieved by the Middle-East and North Africa region, 2.6 per cent by sub-Saharan Africa and 2.3 per cent by Latin America and the Caribbean during the same period.​[2]​

The growth acceleration that has occurred in Bangladesh since about 1990 has been underpinned by faster rate of capital accumulation.​[3]​ From less than 10 per cent of GDP in the 1970s the rate of investment rose to about 17 per cent in the 1980s, rising further to 20 per cent during the 1990s and 24 per cent in the 2000s​[4]​. Even though the current rate of investment in Bangladesh is far below the likes of 40 per cent rates achieved by the hyper-growth economies of East Asia, such comparisons must be tempered by the knowledge of the initial conditions – in particular, of the dire conditions in which the country found itself in the early 1970s. The country was barely able to meet its consumption needs from its own resources, leaving specious little for savings and investment; indeed in some years domestic savings turned out to be negative implying that a part of foreign aid had to be used to meet consumption needs. For that country to come to a stage where within a space of three decades nearly a fifth of GDP is being saved and invested on the average is not a mean achievement at all. The amount of investible resources has been further augmented by the spectacular rise in remittances, which has allowed the national savings rate to exceed the domestic savings by a fair margin.​[5]​ All this has enabled Bangladesh to achieve a rate of investment that was unthinkable only a couple of decades ago.​[6]​

What makes this improvement in investment rates especially remarkable is the dwindling role of foreign assistance in providing investible resources for Bangladesh. In the 1970s, when the country started from the scratch, foreign aid loomed large in all spheres of the economy, accounting for almost 75 per cent of gross investment on the average. Even in the 1980s, the contribution of foreign aid to gross investment was still as high as 40 per cent; by the 2000s, however, it has came down to just over 10 per cent.​[7]​ It is thus evident that the country has managed to accelerate its rate of capital accumulation while at the same time substantially reducing its dependence on the rest of the world for financing its investment. As a result, Bangladesh can claim today to have not only a faster rate of growth than before but also a more self-reliant growth as far as mobilization of investment resources is concerned.

A related feature of Bangladesh’s growth performance is the ease with which it has achieved its growth acceleration without getting into the kind of debt trap that many of the developing countries have found themselves in since the 1980s. The stock of external debt has increased only slightly from 28 per cent of GDP in the first half of the 1980s to just over 32 per cent in the 2000s. This ratio is not particularly low compared to other developing countries, but the important point is that thanks to the low cost of loans the debt servicing burden has remained especially low by international standards. In the first half of the 2000s, debt servicing accounted for a just over 1 per cent of GDP and less than 8 per cent of export earnings. By contrast, during the same period, low and middle income countries as a whole faced a burden that amounted to nearly 6 per cent of GDP and 17 per cent of export earnings.

The relatively low burden of external debt faced by Bangladesh owes itself mainly to the fact that historically the country has depended much more heavily on the less expensive foreign official assistance than on the more expensive commercial borrowing for financing its investment needs. The official foreign aid has itself become somewhat more expensive over time as the proportion of loans has increased at the expense of grants​[8]​, but the loans have been offered at a sufficiently low rate to make the repayment burden far lower than anything that might have obtained with an equivalent flow of private capital. The relative absence of private capital has, of course, its flip side, as it implies a constraint on raising the rate of investment. But at least it has helped avoid on the one hand the short-term problem of volatility in capital movement that has plagued many emerging economies in the past decade and prevent on the other the kind of long-term debt problem that has blighted the development prospects of many countries of Africa and Latin America.

In addition to avoiding an excessive debt burden in the external sphere, Bangladesh has also managed to avoid excessive inflationary pressure in the domestic sphere – yet another scourge that often goes hand in hand with the pursuit of rapid growth. Bangladesh did experience a phase of relatively high inflation of around 13 per cent in the early 1980s owing to excessive expansion of domestic credit that was deliberately engineered by the government in order to finance an ambitious privatization programme. But in a significant departure from the experience of many developing countries, the rate of inflation came down just when growth began to accelerate. It fell to 5.7 per cent when the first spurt of growth acceleration occurred in the 1990s, and fell further to 4.3 per cent during 2001-05. Subsequently, the rate of inflation went up again – to about 8 per cent during 2005-08 – but it did so as part of a global commodity boom rather than as a home spun inflation.

The success in keeping inflation down owed itself to prudent fiscal and monetary policy followed by successive governments ever since the excessive credit growth of the early 1980s precipitated a serious macroeconomic crisis later in the decade. Budget deficit, in particular, has consistently been kept within prudent limits. It was brought down from 6.1 per cent of GDP in the 1980s to 4.7 per cent in the 1990s and 3.8 per cent during the 2000s. Modest as these figures are, they actually overstate the inflationary implications of fiscal policy because these deficits include foreign financing while only the domestic component of deficit financing has direct implications for inflation. As it happens, the domestic component has risen somewhat over the years to meet the shortfall created by declining availability of foreign aid, but still remains quite low. From slightly less than 1 per cent of GDP in the 1980s, domestic financing of budget deficit rose mildly to 1.3 per cent in the 1990s and somewhat more sharply to 2.3 during 2001-05, but even these figures are very low by the standards of developing countries.​[9]​

Prudent conduct of fiscal policy has not only helped to keep inflation down, it has also helped to keep the burden of interest payment down. This in turn has allowed Bangladesh more fiscal space to maintain the rate of public investment. The implications of all this can be seen clearly by contrasting the experience of Bangladesh with its South Asian neighbours.

By relying heavily on domestic borrowing to finance large budget deficits, the governments of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have all incurred huge domestic debts over the years. The problem became progressively worse as higher and higher interest rates had to be offered on treasury bills in order to attract more and more funds from the financial system. In consequence, the burden of interest payment also became progressively heavier over the years. During the period 1991-2005, interest payment in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka amounted to as much as 5-6 per cent of GDP as compared with just 1.2 per cent in Bangladesh. During the same period, the three South Asian neighbours had to spend 30 to 37 per cent of government revenue on account of interest payment alone, as compared with only 13 per cent in Bangladesh. The problem eventually became so acute in these countries that a vicious circle came into being in which governments had to borrow heavily simply to service the interests of past borrowing, which made it harder to bring budget deficits down. This led to a severe constriction of the fiscal space in these countries, with the result that despite mounting fiscal deficits they could not find enough resources to maintain, let alone increase, the rate of public investment. Thus in India the rate of public investment fell from 10 per cent of GDP during the 1980s to an average of 7.5 per cent during 1991-2005, in Pakistan it fell from 9.2 per cent of GDP to 6.5 per cent over the same period, and in Sri Lanka it fell from 5 per cent to 3.2 per cent. By contrast, in Bangladesh the rate of public investment actually increased over the same period – from 5.5 per cent of GDP in the 1980s to 6.6.per cent during 1991-2005. Evidently, even the current rate of public investment is not particularly high in Bangladesh, but the important point to note here is the fact that prudent conduct of fiscal policy has enabled Bangladesh to at least raise the rate of public investment, however modestly, while less prudent fiscal policy has compelled its South Asian neighbours to scale down the rate of public investment.​[10]​,​[11]​

From the broader macroeconomic features, let us now turn our attention to some of the structural features of the Bangladesh economy. Relatively rapid economic growth since the early 1990s has brought about remarkable transformation in the structure of production. In particular, the economy has become increasingly industrialised, so much so that for the first time in history industry has come to contribute more to GDP compared to agriculture. The switchover from an agrarian to an industrial economy occurred at the turn of the last century. In the second half of the 1990s, agriculture and industry stood neck in neck, each contributing about 25 per cent of GDP. Industry, however, leapt ahead in the 2000s, when its share in GDP went up to 28 per cent as compared with agriculture’s 23 per cent.

As it happens, the sector that contributes most to the GDP of Bangladesh is neither industry nor agriculture but services. It should be noted, however, that services has long been the most important sector in terms of contribution to GDP. This is inevitable in an overpopulated but underdeveloped country where surplus labour from agriculture has been compelled to pour into various informal sector activities to eke out a living by converting raw labour into labour services. What is important, though, is the fact that the share of services in GDP has not changed at all over the last three decades, stagnating at just around the 50 per cent mark from the early 1980s up to the present. In other words, the transition that has occurred in the economy is from agriculture towards industry, not towards services.

Industry, of course, is a broad category, including as it does such ancillary activities as construction, mining, and utilities such as power, water supply, etc., in addition to manufacturing. But manufacturing too has surged ahead, thanks largely to the emergence of the garments industry. It is perhaps not generally recognised that manufacturing alone now yields more to GDP than production of crops, the mainstay of the people of Bangladesh for centuries, if not for millennia. This transition is very much a post-2000 phenomenon. Towards of the end of the 1990s, crop production was still contributing more than manufacturing, but their relative positions have reversed since 2000. Thus, during the period from 2001 to 2007, the average contribution of manufacturing stood at 16 per cent of GDP as against 13 per cent from crop production. Bangladesh would thus seem to have well and truly embarked on the path of ‘modern economic growth’ as defined by Kuznets. 

The shift in the structure of production is not fully reflected in the composition of labour force, however, as agriculture continues to be the largest employer. But it is significant that for the first time in the history of the country the proportion of labour force engaged in agriculture has dipped below half. According to the Labour Force Surveys, some 57 per cent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture in the mid-1980s; this proportion fell to 52 per cent by 2002/03 and has fallen further to 48 per cent according to the latest survey of 2005/06. Unlike in the case of production, however, the transfer of labour force has occurred not primarily towards industry, but towards services. But that doesn’t mean that industry, and in particular manufacturing, has not been absorbing additional labour. There was some concern in the recent past that the manufacturing growth of Bangladesh was taking place without creating any new employment, thus evoking the description of ‘jobless growth’. This perception grew despite the visibly spectacular growth of employment in the garments sector. It turns out, however, that the perception was basically misplaced, based as it was on a simplistic comparison of data that were essentially non-comparable.​[12]​ 

The latest Labour Force Survey of 2005/06 should dispel such misperception completely. It shows that manufacturing employment went up from 3.7 million in the late 1990s to 4.3 million in 2002/03, and went up further to 5.2 million by 2005/06, accounting for 11 per cent of the labour force.​[13]​ To put this growth in perspective, it may be noted that between 1999/00 and 2005/06 the elasticity of employment growth with respect to output growth in the manufacturing sector turns out to be 0.9, which is very high by international standards.​[14]​ Whether the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh can be made even more labour-absorbing by making it more labour-intensive in its techniques and composition without compromising its growth potential is an issue that certainly deserves serious scrutiny. But there is no basis for characterizing Bangladesh’s manufacturing growth as ‘jobless growth’.

It is also worth emphasizing that rapid growth in manufacturing employment has not come at the expense of wage growth. In the two and a half decades between 1980 and 2005, the real wages of manufacturing workers have grown a little faster than per capita income in the country as a whole – by 128 per cent as against 100 per cent. Manufacturing workers have in fact enjoyed the fastest growth of wages among all categories of wage workers over the same period.​[15]​

The growth of manufacturing is also reflected in the external sector. Manufactures have always loomed large in the export basket of Bangladesh ever since a big push was given during the Pakistan period to set up jute processing industries. But in recent years, the preponderance of manufactured exports has become even more pronounced and at the same time the composition of exports has also changed radically. The share of manufactures in the export basket has gone up from 74 per cent in the late 1980s to 93 per cent in the 2000s, while the share of jute goods has fallen from 26 per cent to just over 3 per cent. Export of garments has replaced jute goods as the prime mover of export growth, contributing some 75 per cent of all export earnings during the 2000s.

The initial spurt in garment exports was nurtured by the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), agreed by the international community under the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which gave guaranteed access of Bangladeshi garments to the western markets. With the expiry of MFA in January 2005, it was feared that the industry might collapse, or at least contract severely. But despite some initial troubles these apprehensions have not by and large come true. Thanks partly to favourable external conditions (viz. economic boom in the west, continued restrictions on Chinese exports and duty-free access of Bangladeshi exports to the European market) and partly to the creative adjustments made by the domestic industry, garment exports have continued to flourish.

Moreover, the garment industry has itself become more diversified, with knitwear emerging as a major export earner side by side with readymade (woven) garments. During the 1990s, when the garment industry had fully taken off, knitwear contributed only about 14 per cent of export earnings as compared with a contribution of 52 per cent by readymade garments. By contrast, in the post-MFA period (2006-07), knitwear’s share has jumped to 37 per cent while the share of readymade garments’ has fallen to 39 per cent. Diversification is also evident outside the garments sector. Thus, during the period 1991-2005, the contribution of ‘other exports’ has more than doubled  - rising from just about 5 per cent of total exports to close to 12 per cent.

It is significant to note that the growth of manufacturing export, together with the move towards its diversification, has occurred during a period when the economy as a whole has become more open. This is evident from all measures of openness – whether seen in terms of trade ratio (i.e., the value of export plus import as a proportion of national income) or the degree of trade liberalization (as measured by the removal of trade barriers). The trade ratio nearly doubled from 19 per cent in the first half of the 1980s to 36 per cent during 2000-05​[16]​, and rose even further to 45 per cent during 2006-07. This increase in trade orientation was helped partly by the favourable external circumstances that allowed the garments sector to flourish and partly by the phenomenal growth of remittances, which together with rising export earnings made possible a rapidly rising volume of imports.​[17]​ But partly it was also helped by sustained efforts at reducing both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade that started in the 1980s but gathered momentum in the early 1990s. During this process of trade liberalization, a plethora of quantitative restrictions has been removed, a convoluted tariff structure has been radically simplified resulting in just 4 slabs of statutory tariff (0, 5, 15 and 25 per cent as of 2007/08), and the rates of tariff have also been drastically reduced. As a result of tariff reduction, the nominal protection rate (as measured by import-weighted average tariff rate) has come down from 24 per cent in the early 1990s to just 7 per cent during 2006/07.

To what extent trade liberalization has contributed to the growth and diversification of manufactured exports is difficult to say as it is hard to disentangle its effects from those of such exogenous factors such as the trade policies and economic cycle of the rest of the world. It would, however, be reasonable to make at the least the minimalist claim that liberalization is very likely to have made a positive contribution in this regard by reducing the incentive for pervasive import substitution.​[18]​

A distinctive feature of the process of trade liberalization in Bangladesh relates to its impact on government revenue. One common concern with trade liberalization in the developing world has been that tariff reductions might seriously constrict the fiscal space since revenues from import tariffs tend to be the largest contributor to government revenue in these countries. On purely a priori grounds, of course, there is no reason to believe that such an outcome is inevitable, for a number of reasons. First, the process of trade liberalization involves not just reduction of tariff rates but also conversion of quantitative restrictions into tariff protection (the so-called tariffication of quota). Second, as the volume of imports expands in the wake of trade liberalization the size of tariff revenue may actually increase depending on the elasticities of demand for imported goods. Third, and foremost, there is always the scope of replacing tariffs with such trade-neutral taxes as the VAT, which is compatible with the logic of trade liberalization and should help recoup any loss of tariff revenue. Despite these theoretical possibilities, however, the actual experience of the developing world at large confirms the fear about the adverse revenue effect of trade liberalization. A recent study has found that while the developed countries have been able to avoid the adverse revenue effect the developing countries have by and large failed to do so. The middle-income countries in the developing world have been able to recoup only 40-60 cents per dollar lost by way of tariff reduction, while the low-income countries have been able to recoup only 30 cents per dollar lost (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005).

Bangladesh, to its credit, has evidently been able to buck the trend. Thanks mainly to the introduction of VAT in the early 1990s, when trade liberalization began in earnest, and partly to tariffication of quota and rising volume of imports, Bangladesh did not suffer any adverse revenue effect of trade liberalization. The direct impact of tariff reduction was marginally negative, as evidenced by the fact that the relative amount of customs revenue came down from 2.3 per cent of GDP during 1991-95 to 2.0 per cent during 2001-05. But this effect was outweighed by the new revenues obtained from the (trade-neutral) VAT and the (not-so-neutral) supplementary duties. As a result, the overall revenue from indirect taxes went up from 5.5 per cent of GDP during 1991-95 to 6.6 per cent during 2001-05. Over the same period, tax revenue as a whole (including both direct and indirect taxes) went up from 6.8 per cent of GDP to 8.2 per cent. This still represents a very poor revenue effort even by developing country standards, but trade liberalization is not to blame for this. Indeed, as we have just noted, in contrast to most other developing countries Bangladesh managed to implement its trade liberalization programme without any adverse impact on government revenue. The fact that revenues nonetheless remain very low constitutes one of the challenges facing the economy.

Yet another, and perhaps the most important, aspect of Bangladesh’s economic success is that the growth and diversification of the economy over the last two decades has been associated with significant reductions in poverty. In the 1980s, when growth was slow, the rate of poverty reduction was also very slow.​[19]​ However, as the rate of growth accelerated in the 1990s, so did the pace of poverty reduction. In contrast with virtual stagnation of poverty in the preceding decade, the poverty rate declined by 10 percentage points in the 1990s. According to the latest estimates of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the pace of poverty reduction has accelerated even further in recent years, resulting in a 9 percentage points reduction in the space of just five years from 2000 to 2005. This represents a near doubling of the annual rate of poverty reduction (in percentage points terms) as compared with the 1990s.​[20]​

Both urban and rural areas have shared in the recent reduction in poverty. According to the BBS estimates, poverty declined by exactly 17 percentage points in both urban and rural areas in the decade and a half since 1990. Urban poverty fell from 45 percent in 1991/92 to 28 per cent in 2005, and rural poverty fell from 61 per cent to 44 per cent during the same period. Thus, in contrast to the past and present experience of many developing countries, the process of growth and poverty reduction has not been predominantly ‘urban biased’ in Bangladesh – the rural population have also gained almost equally.​[21]​

A number of factors have helped in this regard. First, although some of the major growth-propelling activities, such as the garments industry, are located mainly in the urban and peri-urban areas, their workers are drawn predominantly from rural areas. The remittances they send to rural relatives have played an important part in translating overall economic growth into rural poverty reduction. Second, rural areas have also gained almost as much as urban areas from the external remittances sent by Bangladeshi migrants working abroad. Third, even as the importance of agriculture in the national economy has declined, rural Bangladesh has witnessed a significant expansion in the range and scope of non-farm activities.​[22]​ Evidently, benefits from this expansion have not remained confined to the better off population alone – the poorer segments have gained too. It is eminently plausible that the phenomenal expansion of microfinance, an area in which Bangladesh’s pioneering role has been recognised worldwide, has played a crucial role in enabling the rural poor to both contribute to and benefit from the growth of non-farm activities.​[23]​

Along with the reduction in income poverty, the people of Bangladesh have also enjoyed unprecedented expansion of human capabilities in such spheres as health and education. Significantly, the pace of progress in these spheres gathered momentum in the 1990s at the same time that economic growth began to accelerate. Thus, infant mortality rate declined by almost 40 per cent during the 1990s (falling from 94 per thousand live births in 1990 to 58 in 2000) as against a decline of just 19 per cent during the 1980s (from 111 in 1981 to 94 in 1990). It fell by a further 22 per cent in the six years between 2000 and 2006. Similarly, crude death rate, which had remained practically stagnant in the 1980s at 11-12 deaths per thousand people, fell by more than half (to 4.9) by 2000.​[24]​ Life expectancy rates reveal a similar contrast. After creeping up very slowly from 54.2 years in 1981 to 56.1 years in 1990, it rose sharply in the next decade, standing at 64.2 years by 2000.​[25]​ 

Falling mortality, along with such other factors as greater literacy and female labour force participation, has helped bring about the onset of demographic transition in Bangladesh at a comparatively low level of development by historical standards. This too is primarily a phenomenon of the 1990s. Over the 1980s, total fertility rate had been declining slowly – from 5.0 in 1981 to 4.3 by 1990, but the decline gathered pace in the next decade as the fertility rate fell to 2.6 by 2000.​[26]​

Educational achievements have also been considerable, though not quite as spectacular as some of the health and demographic outcomes. School enrolment at the primary level increased very sharply in the 1990s, and its effect is gradually being felt at the secondary level as well. The gross primary enrollment rate, which was only 61 per cent in 1980, increased to 72 per cent by 1990 and to 96 per cent by 2000.​[27]​ Among other things, the provision for free universal primary education and the Food for Education programme of the government, along with concerted efforts of many non-governmental organizations, are believed to have played a large role in this. 

The most remarkable aspect of the progress in the educational sector has been the manner in which the traditional gender gap in enrolment is being closed. By the turn of the last century, girl’s enrolment in secondary schools had already exceeded that of boys, thanks largely to the Female Secondary School Stipend Programme launched in 1994. Under this programme, a stipend is provided directly to the girl student to help her pay for miscellaneous school fees (other than tuition fees which are paid directly to the school). The programme also made provisions for increasing the number and quality of teachers, especially female teachers, at the secondary level and making the school environment more congenial to girls. All these measures together have together had a huge success in closing the gender gap all throughout the country; as a recent study observes, “Clearly, with this program, Bangladesh has become a pioneer in South Asia in increasing female secondary enrollments and in narrowing gender disparities at the secondary level.” (World Bank, 2005, p.ix)  Furthermore, the gender gap appears to be closing rapidly in primary education as well, as the ratio of females to males in primary schools increased steadily from about 83 per cent in 1991 to 96 per cent in 2000, thereby substantially reducing overall gender disparities in schooling.​[28]​

Although the achievements in the health and education sectors were more impressive after 1990 when economic growth also picked up strongly compared to the preceding decades, it is important to emphasize that it was not through growth alone that the superior outcomes were achieved. Equally important was a conscious decision on the part of the government to allocate an increasing proportion of budgetary resources to these sectors. Thus, the share of health and education in the total budget increased from an average of 14.9 per cent in the 1980s to 21.8 per cent in the 1990s (but stayed around that level thereafter). Serious issues remain about the efficacy with which these resources are administered, but at least Bangladesh can claim to be one of the few developing countries that have met the international target of spending a minimum of 20 per cent of budgetary resources on social sectors.​[29]​


III. Challenges Facing the Bangladesh Economy

The challenges facing the Bangladesh economy from the vantage point of the first decade of the twenty first century are many and diverse in nature. Any discussion of these challenges will, therefore, have to be selective in nature. This section provides a brief introduction to the specific challenges that have been elaborated at length by the remaining chapters of this volume.

(1) One of the major challenges facing the Bangladesh economy is that it is becoming increasingly unequal. As we noted in the preceding section, economic growth accelerated after 1990, and so did the pace of poverty reduction and the pace of improvement in health and educational outcomes. But all this has been achieved alongside growing inequality of income, which at the very least raises questions about the sustainability of the present rate of progress and at worst raises the spectre of social instability waiting in the wings.

According to the estimates made by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), based on the successive rounds of Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES), income distribution was quite stable in the 1980s as the Gini coefficient rose only modestly from 0.36 in 1983/84 to 0.39 in 1991/92. But then came the metamorphosis, as the Gini coefficient jumped to 0.45 in 2000, pointing to a seriously unequalising impact of the growth acceleration that occurred in the 1990s – one that transformed Bangladesh from one of the relatively less unequal societies among the developing countries into one of the more unequal ones among them.

Surprisingly, recent BBS estimates show only a modest further increase in inequality in the present decade, with the Gini coefficient rising to only 0.47 by 2005, despite a further acceleration in growth during this decade. Especially counter-intuitive is the finding that urban inequality did not increase at all during 2000-2005, in sharp contrast to the 1990s when the urban Gini made a quantum leap from 0.37 to 0.50. If true, these estimates would suggest that the pattern of growth in the 2000s has been fundamentally different from that of the 1990s, but there would seem to be no prima facie reasons to think so.

In a recent careful study of the HIES data, Khan (2008) shows, however, that the apparent contrast between the pre-2000 and post-2000 periods is essentially a statistical artefact. There are some serious conceptual difficulties with the way BBS estimates income data from the household surveys. After correcting for those anomalies as much as possible, Khan has found that the trend of rising inequality had in fact continued into the 2000s. According to his revised estimates, the national Gini coefficient increased from 0.303 in 1991/92 to 0.405 in 2000 and then increased further to 0.438 by 2005. Moreover, both urban and rural inequality increased between 2000 and 2005, and they did so roughly in the same proportion.

These findings suggest that rising inequality has been a sustained as well as pervasive phenomenon in Bangladesh in the post-growth-acceleration phase. The underlying reasons for this phenomenon are not yet fully understood. A few studies that have tried to look into its proximate causes have noted that the components of household incomes that have grown the fastest are generally the ones that also happen to be more unequally distributed (Osmani et al., 2006; Khan, 2008). Thus the pattern of growth that has characterized Bangladesh since 1990 seems to contain an unpleasant trade-off between growth and equity. This poses serious challenges from the policy point of view. Should attempts be made to put a brake on the fast-rising components of income for the sake of equity but risking the slowdown of growth? Or, can some way be found to achieve both growth and equity at the same time by either making the fast-rising components of income more equalising in nature or by turning the more equalising components into fast-rising ones? The study by Bhattacharya and Khan in this volume tries to grapple with these issues on the basis of an independent inquiry into the household survey data in conjunction with macro level data.

(2) Bangladesh agriculture has performed quite creditably over the recent decades in meeting the food requirements of a large and growing population. Much of this success has stemmed from the adoption of the Green Revolution technology, which pushed up the frontier of yield and productivity far beyond the traditional levels. Concerns have repeatedly been expressed, however, whether the frontier has already been reached, given the specific geo-ecological constraints faced by Bangladesh agriculture. Occasional pauses in the growth of productivity have given rise to such concerns. So far, the concern about long-term stagnation in productivity growth has proved premature, as occasional pauses have almost invariably been followed by a new growth spurt. Expansion of acreage under HYV seeds, better agronomic practices and the introduction of new hybrid seeds have all contributed towards staving off the predicted stagnation.

Yet, the tasks of sustaining the upward path of productivity and ensuring rising incomes for farmers and agricultural workers remain a major challenge, especially in view of the fact that close to half the labour force still derive their livelihoods from agriculture. In order to meet this challenge, new strategic decisions must be taken on several fronts, a couple of which merit special consideration – viz., diversification of agriculture and introduction of new technology. 

It is widely recognised that Bangladesh agriculture needs to diversify rapidly if it is to provide a sustainable and expanded source of livelihood for the rural people. The process of diversification has already started – from staple crops to commercial crops and from crops to non-crop activities such as horticulture, livestock, and fisheries. The pace of diversification, however, is not rapid enough. Various kinds of market imperfections stand in the away – for example, imperfect access to credit market, input market and product market, inadequate technological adaptation, etc. But it does not follow that the solution lies in providing blanket government support to all kinds of attempts at diversification through protection and subsidies. The policy framework designed to correct the market failures must be nuanced enough to promote only those lines of diversification and in such a manner that best reconcile the demands of efficiency and equity.

From the perspective of efficiency, the challenge is to identify the lines of diversification that are most promising in of view of the evolving pattern of consumer demand (in the case of non-tradables) as well as comparative advantage (in the case of tradables). Special considerations will have to be given to the opportunities and constraints that diversification will face in the context of Bangladesh’s commitment to WTO. From the perspective of equity, the relevant issues are how the pattern of diversification based on demand and comparative advantage will affect the distribution of costs and benefits among different groups of population. In particular, attention will have to be given to the impact on small farmers vis-à-vis large farmers, landless labourers vis-à-vis land-owning farmers, poor consumers vis-à-vis producers, farmers vis-à-vis the owners of agro-processing industry, and so on.

While promoting diversification, the policymakers will have to confront to the reality that sustained productivity improvement over long periods of time can only come from continuous technological innovations. Despite the significant gains made so far, the levels of productivity in Bangladesh agriculture still remain considerably below the levels achieved in East and South-East Asia. New technological breakthrough would be needed in order to narrow this gap. Biotechnology, in the form of genetically modified (GM) crops, has been proposed as one possible way – and for some, the most promising way – of achieving that breakthrough. The issue of biotechnology, however, remains a highly controversial one all over the world for a host of reasons, including concerns with the livelihoods of poor farmers and the impact on health and environment. To some extent, such concerns are quite common in the wake of radical technological changes – somewhat similar concerns were expressed on the eve of Green Revolution as well. Yet, both the potentials and risks associated with biotechnology need to be examined rigorously in the context of Bangladesh agriculture. While biotechnology has occupied a hot seat in popular discussions for some time, there remains a glaring lack of rigorous analysis of the subject from an economic, as opposed to technical, perspective.

A number of issues are involved here. These include: (a) assessing the potential of biotechnology to improve productivity in Bangladesh agriculture and its cost-effectiveness vis-à-vis alternative strategies, (b) the direct impact of biotechnology on labour absorption in agriculture, differentiated by characteristics such as gender, ownership of land, agro-ecological zones, and so on, (c) the kind of relationships the technology is likely to induce between farmer and the market, and between farmers and agro-business at home and abroad, and the implications of these relationships for efficiency and equity, and (c) concerns with health and environment and how best to deal with these concerns.

The chapter by Deb in this volume addresses the major issues related to diversification of agriculture and the chapter by Hossain and Seraj analyses the prospects and problems of the adopting biotechnology in Bangladesh agriculture in light of international experience.

(3) As discussed in the preceding section, the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh has been displaying encouraging signs of dynamism over the last two decades. A major challenge facing the Bangladesh economy is to sustain and enhance this dynamism in the context of a globalising world. The forces of globalisation will inevitably bring about profound changes in the industrial structure of participating countries, and Bangladesh is no exception in this regard. Inefficient industries that have been artificially propped up through protection in the past will wither way, making room for the potentially efficient ones. Identification of such potentially efficient industries and nurturing them is one of the major challenges of industrial strategy facing Bangladesh today.

The problem, however, is that identifying industries with potential comparative advantage is no simple task. The problem is compounded by the fact that the nature of comparative advantage can change quite rapidly. Industries that proved efficient and appeared to have comparative advantage at some stage may turn out to be losing their comparative advantage under changed circumstances in the world economy – as, many fear, could happen to the garment industry of Bangladesh as the existing restrictions on imports from China and other large countries are gradually relaxed in the western markets. Identification of industries with long-term comparative advantage can thus become a tricky affair when the global economy is in a state of flux, as it is at the moment with the emergence of new competitors.

If the long term is too uncertain, perhaps the best one can do is to plan for the medium term, taking the major trends in the global economy as given. But who will do this planning and how? An active government policy of ‘picking the winners’ is sometimes recommended on the basis of East Asian experience, but this policy has generally failed in most other developing countries. Yet, the need for some kind of government support cannot be denied. Devising appropriate measures of support and targeting them to the right industries is a major challenge as getting it wrong could prove immensely costly in terms of misallocating scarce resources.

A related challenge confronting the manufacturing industry in particular, and the economy as a whole, is to address some specific issues related to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bangladesh. The failure of Bangladesh to attract FDI is well known, as are the reasons for this failure. However, there is a point of view which suggests that even if Bangladesh continues to fail to attract FDI generally, there might be some niche areas where prospects might be better. The energy sector has already proved to be one such area. It is necessary to inquire whether there are other niche areas where FDI might be expected to flow, and if so what is the economic basis of such expectation and what can public policy do to make this happen. The chapter by Siddique and Begum in this volume grapples with these issues of industrial strategy and foreign direct investment.

(4) In the context of manufacturing growth, and of economic growth in general, special challenges are involved in meeting the needs of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which have been playing an increasingly important role in the Bangladesh economy. Indeed, the growth acceleration that took place in the 1990s owes itself at least as much to these enterprises as to their larger counterparts, if not more. Wage employment generated by this sector has also been a major force behind accelerated reduction of poverty in the 1990s.​[30]​ In this sense, the SME sector can be said to have been the lynchpin behind the phenomenon of faster growth proceeding in tandem with faster poverty reduction in recent times. Yet, it is arguable that this sector has been growing not primarily because of supportive policy but in spite of its absence. Recent growth in the SME sector has been primarily demand-driven, the main help from the supply side coming from the policy of trade liberalisation, which made it easier to procure raw materials and intermediate inputs.

If SMEs are to continue to contribute to the process of growth with poverty reduction, they will require sustained expansion of the demand stimulus on the one hand and a supportive policy framework on the supply side on the other. On the demand side, it is necessary to understand better the nature of various linkages (on both consumption and production sides) that have been driving the growth of SMEs in the recent past and to assess the sustainability of these linkages in the future. On the supply side, the challenge is to develop a policy framework for supporting the SMEs with regard to access to capital (both physical and financial), access to technology and market, and the regulatory framework. 

While the SME sector as a whole deserves support, special considerations may need to be given to two sub-sectors for their specific significance. One of them is the rural segment of the SME sector, which has special relevance for employment generation and poverty reduction in rural areas. And the other is the light engineering sector, which may have significant spill-over effects and externalities that are essential for overall development of the industrial sector. The chapter by Bakht in this volume offers a thorough analysis of these issues.

(5) Information and communication technology (ICT) will be the major technological foundation of every modern economy in the foreseeable future. Any forward-looking strategy for the development of Bangladesh must embrace it with open arms. The development of ICT will have both long-term and short-term consequences. In the long term, it will have help improve productivity in all sectors of the economy – agriculture, industry, and services. In the short term, it can be an important means of providing employment to the educated youth, which is a major consideration in the view of the rising trend of unemployment among the educated youth. It can also be a major earner of foreign exchange, through the export of software-related services, which is a major consideration in view of Bangladesh’s urgent need to diversify the sources of its export earnings.

There is a presumption in popular discussion that Bangladesh, with its large pool of educated youth, should be well-placed to develop this sector quickly and to become a major player at the world stage. The examples of India and China provide grounds for optimism in this regard. Yet, the sector has not taken off in Bangladesh in a manner that will do justice to the widespread expectations. 

How to realise the full potential of ICT in Bangladesh will remain a major challenge for the policymakers in the foreseeable future. A number of issues are relevant in this context: (a) What are the prospects for ICT-based activities to become a major source of employment for the educated youth of Bangladesh as well as a major source of export earnings? (b) Do we have a potential comparative advantage in this area, and what, if any, pro-active policies should the government pursue to realise any potential comparative advantage? (c) Does the educational system of Bangladesh need to be reformed so as to be more conducive to ICT development, and if so, how? (d) What can the government of Bangladesh do to gain immediate and efficient access to the international network of ICT? (e) Can ICT be used as an instrument for promoting pro-poor growth, for example, by supporting distance learning, offering diagnostic and advisory support to rural health services, and connecting farms and SMEs to markets through improved market information? The chapter by Chowdhury in this volume confronts these weighty questions and offers some strategic advice.

(6) Trade policy will continue to remain a major concern for all countries in the age of globalisation. Two sets of issues are of special significance in the context of Bangladesh. The first relates to the nature and speed of trade liberalisation, and the other relates to the oft-discussed concern with large bilateral trade imbalances.

As noted in the preceding section, Bangladesh embarked upon the path of trade liberalization in earnest in the early 1990s and has since made considerable progress in this regard. The speed of liberalization seemed to have stalled, however, in the later 1990s, and this has caused some concern among some quarters, especially the Breton Woods institutions. Paradoxically, some others have claimed that Bangladesh has actually liberalised too fast, especially in relation to its neighbouring countries. Both claims have some empirical validity, but the question of whether the speed of liberalization has been too fast or too slow cannot be resolved simply by looking at past speed or the speed of other countries. The appropriate speed of liberalisation for Bangladesh should be judged in the light of several parameters, viz., (a) the degree of flexibility of its factor markets, (b) the technological capability of its entrepreneurs to switch production into new and more profitable areas, (c) adequacy of the social safety net, and (d) the nature of competition Bangladesh faces from other countries. One of the challenges facing the policymakers is to take these and other relevant parameters into account and arrive at a judgement about the desirable speed and sequencing of trade liberalisation for the short to medium term future.

Apart from the overall speed of liberalisation, there is also an important issue of speed for specific sectors. The question is whether there is a need to foster import substitution in specific sectors rather than open them up for the sake of growth. One of the disturbing features of the Bangladesh economy in the recent past has been the tendency for growth to be stifled by the balance of payments constraint. Because of the highly import-dependent nature of the economy, any serious push for growth creates unsustainable import demand, thereby dampening the momentum of growth.​[31]​ This suggests the need for reorienting the production structure so as to reduce excessive import dependence. The answer does not of course lie in blanket import substitution disregarding the consequent efficiency losses. However, it is important to explore whether there are some critical areas where judicious and selective import substitution could help remove important bottlenecks to domestic production and thereby reduce import dependence.

Another set of issues relates to the phenomenon of persistent bilateral trade imbalances. Bangladesh has run a large and persistent trade deficit with India for many years. Recently, trade deficit with China has assumed even bigger proportions. The deficit with India, in particular, has generated a great deal of passion in popular debate but it has failed to offer much enlightenment as several related but distinct issues have become entangled. While the popular debate has focussed primarily on the existence and size of the deficit, the arguments have often been derived from several underlying concerns – for instance, the alleged restrictive trade practices of India, or the fear that potentially efficient infant industries in Bangladesh were being crippled by competition with Indian products, or the concern that the livelihoods of particular groups of poor producers were being threatened by competition. While all these concerns may be genuine, it doesn’t help to mix them up with the issue of bilateral deficits since such deficits may exist with or without any of these problems and all of these problems may exist even in the absence of deficit. Any attempt to deal with the concern with large bilateral trade deficits must try to keep these issues separate for analytical purposes, even though in practice the same policy measure may have a bearing on several of these issues at the same time. The chapter by Rahman, Razzaque and Raihan in the present volume tries to offer a degree of clarity on some of these trade-related issues.

(7) From small beginnings in the 1970s, manpower export and remittances have now become one of the dominant features of the Bangladesh economy. In 2006, more than half a million workers, which is equal to about 1 per cent of the labour force, were working abroad and sending remittances worth about 8 per cent of GDP. On an average during 2000-2007, remittances have provided two and a half times as much resource as foreign aid and more than a quarter of all foreign exchange earnings, and have amounted to about a quarter of national savings and investment.

By virtue of its sheer volume, remittances have come to exert a decisive influence on a number of policy dimensions such as management of the balance of payments, conduct of monetary policy, easing the foreign exchange constraint on domestic production, and so on. At the same time, the remittance income received by the friends and relatives of expatriate workers plays an important role in alleviating poverty at the household level – both directly as income transfer and indirectly through spill-over effects.

Despite its overwhelming importance, however, manpower export does not receive the same degree of attention in policy-making circles as do other sources of foreign exchange and income, such as garments, for example. This imbalance needs to be redressed. One major challenge facing policymakers in this regard is how to upgrade the skills and quality of migrant workers so that they can find more remunerative jobs abroad, thereby helping to enhance the flow of remittances for the benefit of themselves, their relatives back home and the country at large. Other important concerns include: (a) How to promote export of manpower to new destinations, such as the rapidly developing countries of East and South-east Asia? (b) Can anything be done to reduce dependence on intermediaries and build manpower exporting enterprises owned by migrants in the form of labour export cooperatives or firms? (c) Is there room for improving the current incentive structure and banking facilities for increasing the flow of remittances through legal channels? (d) Can the incentive structure be improved so as to ensure more productive use of remittances? The chapter by Choudhury and Habib grapples with many of these questions.

(8) The financial sector of Bangladesh has undergone significant changes in the recent years as a consequence of a combination of factors. These include (a) financial liberalisation, especially interest rate deregulation, (b) growing importance of the private sector in commercial banking, (c) emergence of a large micro-finance sector that is eager to scale up its operations, (d) exchange rate reform, especially the introduction of current account convertibility and a managed floating exchange rate system, and (e) possible opening up of the financial sector to external actors. The combined effect of all these factors is to reduce the reach and strength of Bangladesh Bank’s direct control over the allocation of financial resources and to strengthen the market forces so as to increase the efficiency of resource use.

This does not, however, mean that the role of Bangladesh Bank will diminish in the emerging scenario. But the nature of its role will change – from a directive role to a supportive one, and so must the tools of policy and the manner in which they are to be used. In playing this new role, Bangladesh Bank will have to face at least three important challenges. First, it must try to reconcile the dictates of efficiency with the concern for equity – especially, to deal with the problems of transaction costs and other market imperfections that tend to restrict the flow of credit to small but deserving borrowers such as small farmers and small and medium enterprises. Second, as both the domestic money market and the foreign exchange market become increasingly liberalised, the conduct of monetary policy will have to take increasing cognisance of the interactions of the two markets. Specifically, the tools of monetary policy must be wielded in a manner that simultaneously addresses the concerns of the two markets – viz. the concern with price stability internally and the concern with currency convertibility externally within a framework of a floating of exchange rate system. Third, the framework of prudential regulation must be strengthened to prevent the potential moral hazards associated with increasing financial liberalisation.
The major issues that will arise in meeting these challenges may be summarised in the form of the following questions. (a) How to strike a balance between efficiency and equity in credit allocation in the process of financial reform? In particular, how best can the system address the credit needs of small farmers and small and medium enterprises (SME)? (b) How can the Bangladesh Bank conduct its monetary policy in a manner that is consistent with the policy of interest rate deregulation and yet be effective in achieving the goals of ensuring price stability, sustaining current account convertibility, and managing the floating exchange rate system without undue stress on the balance of payments? (c) How to rid the financial system of the scourge of non-performing loans and to devise a regulatory system that would prevent re-emergence of the problem, and to do so in a manner that does not destroy the basic principle of a market-based system of financial intermediation? Many of these issues are addressed illuminatingly in the chapter by Farashuddin, which draws upon the author’s personal experience of running the Bangladesh Bank for several years.

(9) It is often said that human resource is the most important resource that Bangladesh has and that the country’s prosperity depends crucially on the fullest possible utilization of this resource. And yet the country is far from achieving this goal. It was noted in the preceding section that despite some increase in unemployment over the years the rate of open unemployment still remains quite low (at about 4 per cent). However, the aggregative picture hides some worrying features of the labour market and its interface with the educational system. The issue is not just that of underemployment, which is known to exist even though its magnitude is hard to measure. There is also an issue about open unemployment itself among an important segment of the labour market – viz., the educated youth.

The Labour Force Surveys show that open unemployment among the educated youth is high and rising. In 2002/03, the rate of youth unemployment (including all youth, educated and uneducated) was some 6.3 per cent, in contrast to the overall unemployment rate of 4.3 per cent. Significantly, however, the extent of unemployment among the youth was positively correlated with the level of education, with the most educated ones facing the most serious problem of unemployment. In fact, among those who had no schooling at all, the rate of unemployment was slightly lower than the overall unemployment rate. But it begins to rise with education, with those with SSC/HSC degree or its equivalent facing an unemployment rate of 13.5 per cent and those with Bachelors’ degree as much as 22.4 per cent.

Admittedly, much of the unemployment among the educated youth is in the nature of search unemployment, as young people wait and search for the right kind of job. The fact that they can afford to do so suggests that many of them (though not all) come from relatively well-to-do families on whose support they can count during the search period. To that extent, unemployment among the educated youth may not entail an equivalent degree of poverty, but it does represent serious wastage of valuable human resources. To give an idea about the magnitude, those with SSC degree or above suffer from double digit rates of unemployment and they constitute nearly one-third of youth labour force. This is an enormous waste of valuable human resources created though prolonged and heavy investment into human capital. A poor country such as Bangladesh can ill afford to incur this waste. 

The existence of large-scale unemployment among the educated youth suggests that there exists a serious mismatch between the quality of the labour force and the requirement of the labour market. The nature of the labour market – at least the segment of the market that is relevant for the educated youth – has undergone radical transformations in the last few decades. The importance of the public sector as provider of jobs has diminished considerably, while the importance of the private sector has increased. The nature of skills demanded by the labour market has also been transformed accordingly. Further transformations are taking place with the emergence of new technologies (such as ICT) and with increasing integration of the country with the global economy. Evidently, the educational system of Bangladesh is failing to meet the new demands of the labour market, indicating the existence of serious inefficiency in either the labour market or the educational system or both. Either the labour market is not providing adequate signal of what it needs (owing to either distortion of wages or non-transparent employment practices), or the educational system is not capable of receiving the signals and responding to them quickly. In either case, loss of efficiency in the utilization of human resources is a serious problem facing the economy of Bangladesh.

There is a further problem – that of equity. It is widely recognised that some of the emerging features of the educational system are making it harder for children from poorer families to get access to the best jobs in the market. This inequity arises partly from differential access to educational institutions with reputation for good quality. It is well-known that the overall quality of education has deteriorated sharply in the country. However, there do exist educational institutions – at all levels – that have maintained, or even enhanced, their reputation for quality. To get access to these institutions is considered a privilege because their reputation for quality – whether genuine or putative – gives an advantage to their students in the labour market. Obviously, access to such institutions has to be rationed, one way or the other. The problem, however, is that the principal rationing mechanism that has emerged in the recent years tends to operate in a highly regressive manner. This mechanism relies heavily on supplementary private tuition (more popularly known as ‘coaching’), as it has become practically impossible to be enrolled in the well-reputed institutions without extensive recourse to supplementary tuition. But such tuition is expensive and beyond the means of poor families. The meritorious children from poorer families are, therefore, very likely to be excluded from access to the educational institutions with reputation for quality and as a consequence are likely to be excluded from access to the good jobs as well. This is creating a mechanism for inter-generational transmission of poverty on the one hand and exacerbating the existing inequalities on the other. Any equity-conscious educational policy must be sensitive to this pernicious tendency. Masum’s chapter in this volume examines the evidence for and addresses these issues of inefficiency and inequity in the interface between the educational system and the labour market of Bangladesh.

(10) Increasing participation of women in the labour force has been one of the significant developments that have occurred in the Bangladesh society in the last few decades. Women’s new-found involvement in directly income-earning activities has had far-reaching effects on several dimensions of human development. As has been well documented in the literature, women’s involvement in market-based income-earning activities has helped reduce poverty and enhance women’s empowerment at the household level. The latter in turn has had a favourable impact on several other dimensions such as fertility, children’s health and education, and so on. There is, therefore, much to cheer about women’s increasing participation in the labour force.

The challenge now is to make this participation more rewarding from the point of view of women themselves and of the society at large. In particular, it is important to ask whether women have the opportunities to acquire the same level of skills as men, and once they acquire the skills whether they enjoy access to the same kinds of jobs as men, and finally once they get access whether they receive similar terms and conditions as men. This is because women’s empowerment depends not just on their participation in the labour market but also on the relative quality of their participation vis-à-vis men’s. If discrimination is rife, as many suspect to be the case, it is important to identify the factors tend to accentuate and the factors that attenuate the degree of discrimination. For example, it needs to be investigated whether the degree of discrimination varies with factors such as education, age, asset ownership, and so on. The general point is that knowing the parameters of discrimination is essential for formulating policies and taking appropriate social action for the purpose of achieving greater empowerment of women. The chapter by Amin in this volume sheds valuable light on these issues by identifying the nature and determinants of women’s participation in labour market in Bangladesh.

(11) Bangladesh is often commended by the international community for the relative success it has achieved in the health sector over the last couple of decades, as reflected in faster improvement in life expectancy and faster decline in child mortality compared to most other countries at similar levels of income. This success is genuine, and Bangladesh certainly deserves credit on this score. However, this does not mean that all is well on the health front. The success that has been achieved so far has been built on a small number of highly successful programmes – viz., massive immunization against communicable childhood diseases, oral rehydration therapy (ORT) for diarrhoea, and access to safe drinking water through widespread installation of tubewells in rural areas (reversed somewhat in recent years because of arsenic contamination). But persistent failures continue to plague most other aspects of the health sector. In particular, primary health care and provision of essential health services at the grassroots level remain in shambles (with the exception of immunization and ORT).

Over the last decade or so, the government of Bangladesh has undertaken ambitious donor-funded projects (e.g. the Health and Population Sector Programme) to improve the delivery of health services at all levels – with special focus on the community level. Yet, all the evaluations of these programmes show that they have largely failed to improve the quality of health services, especially for the poor clients. Identifying the reasons for this persistent failure and proposing the means of addressing them remains a task of fundamental importance.

Apart from investing more in the health sector, two other considerations are likely to figure prominently in any future programme for primary health care. One of them relates to the institutional framework through which the healthcare services are to be delivered. Issues of community participation, involvement of NGOs, and public-private partnerships will figure prominently in this context. The other consideration relates to the issue of financing health services partly through some form of cost recovery in a manner that is consistent with the twin concerns with efficiency and equity. Specifically, the policymakers will have to confront a range of issues such as: (a) What are the main impediments that bedevil the quality of service delivery in the area of essential health services, especially to the poor? (b) Which models of relationship between the public sector, private sector, and NGOs are likely to be most effective in this sector, given the realities of Bangladesh society? (c) How best to ensure community participation as a means of improving the quality of service delivery and of increasing the efficiency and equity of alternative cost recovery systems? The chapter by Mahmud in this volume addresses some of these concerns.

(12) Energy sector is the foundation of a modern industrial society. In Bangladesh, this foundation has been built upon natural gas in recent decades. So long as the domestic supply of gas remains assured, development of the energy sector will enjoy at least the advantage of having a readily available fuel. However, the initial optimism about Bangladesh floating over an ocean of gas, and presumably oil too, is increasingly giving way to the pessimistic view that reserves are in fact quite small. While precise estimates of reserves remain a matter of dispute, a consensus seems to be emerging that the existing reserves will not last more than twenty or thirty years, unless some major new discoveries were to alter the picture dramatically. Indeed, it is this presumption of inadequate reserves that has been put forward as the major argument against export of gas to India – at least as the official explanation, although the political economy of the issue is a lot more complicated than that.

While the inadequacy of reserves is emphasised repeatedly in the context of gas export, there appears to be a strange reluctance to embrace the full implications of the argument. If natural gas indeed ceases to be plentiful within twenty or thirty years, Bangladesh should be seriously worried about the prospects of the energy sector, and about development of the economy as a whole. Alternative sources of fuel will have to be explored, but given the long gestation period required for developing new sources of fuel and for restructuring the economy on that basis, there would appear to be very little time left for Bangladesh. The lack of preparedness for the eventuality of a radical shift away from gas-based energy in not too distant a future is shocking. A major immediate challenge is to examine the implications of this eventuality for the prospects of the energy sector, explore the feasibility of alternative sources of energy such as hydropower (which will require collaboration with Nepal, Bhutan and India) and solar power (which will require significant technological adaptation), etc., and to implement measures so as to ensure a smooth transition to alternative energy sources. The chapter by Asaduzzaman and Billah provides an in-depth analysis of the challenges involved in meeting Bangladesh’s energy needs for the future.

(13) As Bangladesh seeks to accelerate the rate of economic growth even further, one of the challenges it will face is how to reconcile the demands of growth with the demands of protecting the environment. Destruction of the environment is not an inevitable consequence of development, but it may easily happen if attention is not paid to it. That is why conscious effort is needed to engender a process of sustainable development – it will not happen automatically through market forces alone (although it might be possible to put market forces to the service of sustainable development through imaginative use of policy interventions). This is true as much in Bangladesh as anywhere else. A degree of consciousness about the need for fostering sustainable development has clearly emerged in Bangladesh society. What is much less clear, however, is the extent to which public policy is being reoriented in line with the emerging consciousness.






The objective of this chapter was to put the rest of the chapters in perspective by providing an overview of economic successes achieved by Bangladesh so far and identifying some of the major challenges it faces from the vantage point of the first decade of the twenty first century. The success stories that have been highlighted here include a substantial acceleration of growth since the early 1990s, achieving the growth acceleration without falling either into a debt trap or an inflationary trap as many developing countries have tended to do, success in raising savings and investment rates to respectable levels in the face of declining availability of foreign aid, remarkable structural transformation of the economy whereby manufacturing has come to contribute more to GDP than crop production which had been the mainstay of the economy for centuries, combining rapid growth of manufacturing output with equally rapid growth of manufacturing employment and wages, encouraging signs of diversification in both manufacturing and export sectors, managing trade liberalization without any adverse effect on government revenue, combining accelerating growth with accelerating poverty reduction across the board in contrast to the phenomenon of ‘urban bias’ in many developing countries, and accelerating improvement in health and educational outcomes supported by significant reallocation of budgetary resources towards the social sectors.

This is no doubt an impressive list of success, but the challenges that remain are no less formidable. The particular challenges that have been identified for discussion in this volume include rising inequality of income, sustaining the momentum of agricultural growth through diversification and prudent use of biotechnology, managing the incentive structure for industrial growth in a globalized world where comparative advantage keeps shifting, unleashing the potential of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the information and communication technology (ICT) to propel economic growth on the one hand and contribute to poverty reduction on the other, finding the right speed and sequence of further trade liberalization along with dealing with the issue of large bilateral trade imbalances, managing the growth of manpower export with a view to ensuring the welfare of migrant workers on the one hand and enhancing the flow of remittances on the other, conducting monetary and financial policies in a way that combines the efficiency gains of liberalised financial and foreign exchange markets with the demands of equity, reforming the labour market and the educational system in tandem so that the full potential of human resources, especially those embodied in the educated youth, can be realised fully in an efficient and equitable manner, removing the impediments to and discrimination against women in the labour market so that the rising trend of female labour force participation can engender genuine empowerment of women, addressing the existing inefficiencies and inequities of healthcare delivery systems so that the goal of good health for all can become a reality, confronting the energy crisis that threatens to undermine the momentum of economic growth, and ensuring economic growth in an environmentally sustainable manner.
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^1	  As the title suggests, the intention is to present only a brief overview, leaving a more in-depth treatment of specific issues to the remaining chapters of this volume.
^2	  Bangladesh’s South Asian neighbours have, however, done either equally well or even better than Bangladesh during the same period. Thus, during 1980-2025, India achieved an average growth rate of 5.8 per cent, Pakistan 5.3 per cent, Sri Lanka 4.6 per cent, and Nepal 4.5 per cent.
^3	  A recent exercise in growth accounting has shown, for all the conceptual and practical difficulties that such exercises are fraught with, that the growth acceleration of the 1990s owed itself primarily to faster capital accumulation and secondarily to productivity growth (Mujeri and Sen, 2002).
^4	  Unless otherwise specified, the expression ‘2000s’ in this paper refers to the six-year period from 2000/01 to 2006/07.
^5	  The rate of domestic savings has gone up from 11.6 per cent of GDP in the 1980s to 19.3 per cent in the 2000s and national savings rate (after including remittances) has gone up from 17 per cent of GDNI (gross disposable national income) to 25.5 per cent.
^6	  The current rates of investment in Bangladesh are comparable to those of India and Sri Lanka, and higher than the rest of South Asia.
^7	  As a percentage of GDP, foreign aid has come down from 8 per cent in the 1970s to 6.3 per cent in the 1980s and a mere 2.6 per cent in the 2000s. It’s also worth noting that even though the absolute amount of foreign aid has not declined (in current dollars), it has actually declined in per capita terms – from about 14 US dollars per person in the 1980s to just over 10 US dollars in the 2000s.
^8	  In the first half of the 1980s, the loan component constituted slightly less than half of foreign official assistance, but by the 2000s its share has risen to more than two-thirds.
^9	  Taking the period 1991-2005 as a whole, domestic financing of budget deficit averaged about 1.6 per cent of GDP in Bangladesh, which contrasts with 7.9 per cent in India, 6.6 per cent in Sri Lanka and 5.5 per cent in Pakistan.
^10	  The Indian scenario has changed quite radically since 2005, however, as increased flow of revenue earnings, thanks partly to the buoyancy effect of high GDP growth and partly to improved revenue administration, has greatly expanded the fiscal space. 
^11	  For a more detailed account of the linkages between fiscal policy, public investment, and growth in South Asia, see Osmani (forthcoming, a).
^12	  For more on the nature of the problems of data comparability and on what a careful sifting of data shows about the trend in manufacturing employment in Bangladesh, see Osmani (2005).
^13	  These figures are based on the ‘usual’ definition of labour force of age 15 and over.
^14	  For a discussion of international evidence in this regard, see, among others, Islam (2003), Khan (2006) and Osmani (forthcoming, b). 
^15	  However, the fact that the real wages of other categories of workers have grown much more slowly (only 43 per cent for agricultural workers and 32 per cent for construction workers) suggests that the working class as a whole has fallen behind the rest of the population. The issue of income distribution is discussed further in Section III.
^16	  This rendered Bangladesh more trade-oriented than India (23 per cent) and Pakistan (29 per cent), though less than Sri Lanka (66 per cent) and Nepal (44 per cent) during the same period.
^17	  As a proportion of GDP, the value of remittances went up from 2.6 per cent in the 1980s to 6.3 per cent in the 2000s. During 2006-07, it stood at 8.3 per cent.
^18	  A recent econometric analysis using an error correction model confirms the existence of a positive relationship between trade liberalization and export growth in Bangladesh (Dawson, 2006). For further analysis of the impact of trade liberalization in Bangladesh, see Ahmed and Sattar (2004).
^19	  According to one estimate, the poverty rate, as measured by the percentage of population below the poverty line, hardly changed between 1983/84 and 1991/92, stagnating around 53 per cent (Osmani et al., 2006, Table II.1).
^20	  According to the BBS estimates, the poverty ratio stood at 40 per cent in 2005 compared to 48.9 per cent in 2000 and 58.8 per cent in 1991/92. These estimates would vary depending on the methodology chosen for estimating poverty but the qualitative conclusion regarding the accelerating pace of poverty reduction would still remain valid.
^21	  Strictly speaking, to the extent that urban poverty had a smaller base in 1990 the same percentage point reduction actually implies faster rate of poverty reduction in urban areas as compared to the rural areas.
^22	  Osmani et al. (2006, Table II.3) estimated that the share of non-farm income in total rural income had gone up from 26 per cent in 1991/92 to 43 per cent in 1999/2000, while the share of farm income fell from 53 per cent to 33 per cent during the same period.
^23	  Evidence for the poverty-reducing effect of microfinance abounds in Bangladesh, even though it is hard to say what proportion of the overall decline in rural poverty can be attributed to it.
^24	  There is some worrying sign, however, that the crude death rate may have risen somewhat since 2000.
^25	  The rate of progress has, however, slowed down considerably in recent years, as life expectancy has risen from 64.2 years in 2000 to just 65.4 years in 2006. This is consistent with the reversal of crude death rate mentioned above.
^26	  The decline in fertility rate seemed to have stalled in the late 1990s for several years, but it appears to have resumed the declining trend very recently.
^27	  The net enrolment rate was, however, somewhat lower, estimated to be around 86 per cent in 2000 according to administrative data but as low as 65 per cent according to household-level survey data (World Bank, 2005).
^28	  “Although there are spatial variations in the extent of gender disparity in schooling in Bangladesh, the ratio of females to males in primary and secondary schools is never lower than 86% for any region (and goes as high as 117% in some regions). Six regions, out of a total of 14, have a female majority in primary and secondary schools.” (World Bank, 2005, p.ix)
^29	  It should be noted, however, that despite this apparent achievement, as a proportion of GDP the amount of resources spent on health and education is very low even by developing country standards, standing at just 3 per cent in the 2000s. This is a reflection of the fact that public expenditure itself remains a very small proportion of GDP in Bangladesh, owing to persistent inability to raise government revenue to a satisfactory level.
^30	  For a fuller analysis of the linkages between small enterprise growth, wage employment and poverty reduction in Bangladesh, see Osmani et al. (2006).
^31	  For elaboration of this argument, see Mahmud (2004).
